Investigative Report
on the Kootenai Creek Fire
Why I did the investigation
I, like many, was totally frustrated by the United States Forest Service’s (USFS) management of the Kootenai Creek Fire of 2009 near Stevensville, Montana, but the breaking point came September 19th when the fire finally burned onto the face of the mountains. That day and the days following I determined to turn my frustration into action. I should note that this was not the first time that I had been frustrated with the USFS, this time it just hit closer to home – scarring the view from where I live. One reason for my action is that I sensed a need for someone to educate other citizens who do not have the information to know why things should be different in regards to fire and the forest. I realized that I could help with that need, because my father is a professional forester with a Forestry degree from the University of Montana and 35 years of experience in the forest. I have had the privilege of working with him in the forest and learning much from him over the years.
The decision to take action was shared by my father. We started by writing a petition, setting up a website, and circulating the petition. Eventually I pursued an investigation into the USFS’s management of the Kootenai Creek Fire, because I suspected that they had misled the public.
The investigation
I requested records, regarding management of the fire, from the Bitterroot National Forest under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I am glad to say that they cooperated in a helpful manner and gave me the records that I requested. Since then I have reviewed the records and other sources of information. I have found that the facts regarding the place where the fire started, fire conditions during the early days of the fire, their management decisions, and their prioritization of firefighter safety do not correspond with what they presented to the public. The following is a presentation of these facts, some analysis, and my conclusions.
The fire area and conditions were misrepresented to the public
USFS officials misrepresented the area where the fire started and fire conditions during the early days of the fire. This was done multiple times in news releases, public statements, and in other USFS documents. The following are some examples that I will address. On a fire information sheet dated July 23, 2009 is this statement, “Due to the rugged and inaccessible terrain in which the fire was started, this is a challenging fire to manage.” Because of photos that I received from the USFS and because I have hiked to the area, I know that “inaccessible” is a misleading word to use in the way that they used it. While there is mildly rugged terrain in the area where the fire started, and the hillside is steep, the area is not inaccessible. A news release dated August 5, 2009, says, “Fire managers established a goal to suppress this fire right from the start, but recognized that due to the hazardous conditions on the ground, there would be limited opportunities to utilize ground-based firefighters or air-based resources safely and effectively.” Based on the information that I have, I am fairly confident that the conditions on the ground were too hazardous for ground-based firefighters the first night (July 12, 2009) and may have been the next day too. The problem is that this news release leaves you to assume that the hazardous conditions continued and the opportunities were limited. But, based on USFS pictures taken on July 14, 2009, it would be preposterous to refer to the conditions on the ground as hazardous. The fire was so inactive that it could have been contained and mopped up, especially since there was no shortage of personnel that early in the season. Yes, there would have been hazards, but there always are with firefighting; they come with the job. It would seem that the fire managers were on vacation or looking the other way for at least five days (July 14-18th), because USFS suppression records, my memory of watching the fire from the valley, and USFS pictures taken on July 18, 2009 all indicate that during that period the fire’s activity was minimal. So they had at least five days to put the fire out. Now, if for some reason I have missed some legitimate issue preventing ground-based firefighters from doing what I have proposed, I know that helicopter water drops could have contained this fire. The fire could have been contained immediately, because Paul Armstrong, who has a helicopter company in the Stevensville area, 17 years of experience in helicopter firefighting, and a “Call When Needed” contract with the USFS, saw the lightning strike and smoke and called the USFS fire report line to report the fire. When he called he also offered to take his type 2 helicopter right then to drop water on the fire. He is confident that he could have contained the fire with one water drop. The dispatcher turned down his offer. Based on the information presented above regarding the time period of July 14th through the 18th, we know that it would have been very easy to contain the fire with helicopter water drops during that period, if the USFS decided that it was too dangerous for firefighters on the ground. Paul Armstrong backs me up on this. According to USFS records, they did drop water on the fire on July 17, 2009 (during that period). Why didn’t they go all the way and contain the fire? It seems that they did not want to. So were USFS officials honest with the public? Judge for yourself as you read this quote from the Missoulian (Monday, September 21, 2009 edition, reporter Betsy Cohen writing), “Ritter told the residents at Sunday’s meeting that firefighters have not been able to aggressively fight the fire for the past two months because it has been burning in steep, rocky, confined canyons. A ‘big air show’ would not have worked, and would have put pilots and firefighters at great risk, he said.”
Locating the fire: ignorance, carelessness, or deception?
Regarding the specific location of the start of the fire I present the following facts:
- On day one (July 12, 2009) the initial size up placed the fire at N46 33.155 W114 14.128 and on the lower third of the slope (WildCAD Incident Card, page 1). According to USFS pictures of the fire, Garmin® BaseCamp™ maps, and my GPS readings when I was up there, these coordinates are not very accurate, but they are in the general area. These coordinates are acceptable because I do not expect the initial size up to be precise.
- On July 13, 2009 the USFS published a Decision for the Kootenai Creek incident; in this document the coordinates given for the fire are N46 55.420 W114 23.670, which is north and west quite a distance from the fire, probably in Idaho.
- The USFS sign posted at the Kootenai Creek trailhead indicated that as of July 12, 2009 the fire was located in the SE quarter of the NE quarter of section 10; that area is about 3/4 of a mile from where the fire started. That sign was still posted in November 2009 when we went up there to attempt to get to the spot where the fire started. Since the sign did not match with what we had seen on maps at the Fire Smart wagon and in the newspaper, my father called the Stevensville Ranger District before we hiked. The Fire Management Officer there confirmed that the sign was accurate in regard to where the fire started.
- The coordinates, for the point of origin, they sent to me in response to my FOIA request are N46 33.900 W114 14.700. These same coordinates appear on USFS documents, regarding the Kootenai Creek incident, starting on July 22, 2009 (based on the documents that I have). These coordinates are for a point up on the top third of the slope and a little to the west of where the fire started; according to USFS records, this point did not burn until July 23, 2009.
- In the Executive Summary on page two of the Strategic Implementation Plan, which was signed by four USFS officials on the 27th and 28th of July 2009, is this statement, “The initial size up determined that the fire was high up on the north slope of Kootenai Creek….”
- The reason that I know roughly where the fire started is because I received pictures of the fire, taken during the first week, from the USFS as part of my FOIA request. Some of the pictures clearly show where the fire was during that first week; some also show how inactive and small the fire was for much of that week (see pictures above). None of these pictures are on www.inciweb.org, the website where the USFS provides information on specific fires for the public.
These facts cannot all be explained away as just typos and coincidence. Here are two possible explanations: One, the USFS officials responsible for them are incompetent and careless. Did they look at the pictures? Do they know how to read a map? Or two, they indicate that USFS officials purposefully published false information while not making other information public to reduce the possibility that someone would be able to find where the fire started and prove that it could have been put out.
Forest Service officials were dishonest
Regarding their decision to suppress this fire: suppressing the Kootenai Creek Fire was a part of USFS officials’ initial decision, but it was not the whole or only decision by any means. Consider these two quotes, “Allow fire to play its natural role in designated wilderness to the west. Utilize natural barriers and aviation assets to limit fire spread to the east where values at risk exist.” (Decision page 5, Incident Objective, July 13, 2009) “Fire movement to the ridgetop north and to the west further into the wilderness would not be impeded. … Movement to the west was no threat to values and would enhance wilderness values; although there is some possibility that the fire could still hook into Bass Creek and later be an issue.” (Report by Team, Decision Description, July 25, 2009) In light of those quotes, the following quote from the Bitterroot National Forest’s August 5, 2009 news release is a lie, “While many have asked about the intent to ‘let this fire burn’, agency officials are quick to confirm that this fire is not being ‘allowed to burn’ or managed for resource benefits. Fire managers established a goal to suppress this fire right from the start,”. One more quote regarding this: In the September 23, 2009 issue of the Bitterroot Star, Michael Howell writing about District Ranger Dan Ritter says, “He said that the decision on the Kootenai Creek Fire from the beginning was to suppress it.” It was dishonest for USFS officials to tout the decision to suppress this fire without also openly acknowledging the joint decision to allow the fire to burn in certain directions.
They did not prioritize firefighter safety
Regarding the issue of firefighter safety, I want to begin by saying that I agree that firefighter safety should be the first priority, but we also need to remember the inherent risks involved in certain aspects of life. Unfortunately USFS officials at times seem to use firefighter safety as a convenient cover-up for poor decisions. USFS officials did use firefighter safety as a reason for not being able to stop the Kootenai Creek Fire when it was in the canyon, but the problem is that reality tells us that they were not putting firefighter safety first. It is clear that USFS officials knew from the start that this fire could burn out of the canyon and destroy private property. On page 13 of the Strategic Implementation Plan of July 26, 2009, in the Preplanned Response section is this statement, “Because the fire was likely to threaten private property, the District Ranger made the decision that suppression was the appropriate management response.” It is logical to assume that they also knew that it could become a large, dangerous fire. Now put this with the fact that they could have put the fire out during the first week when it was small and inactive, and we have to question whether they were putting firefighter safety first or not. Instead of putting the fire out when the risks where minimal, they allowed the possibility of a much riskier situation. This situation became reality and many more firefighters were put at risk fighting a more dangerous fire, more pilots were put at risk making many more flights, sometimes in worse conditions. I do not think that USFS officials were putting firefighter safety first during the first week of this fire. Thankfully the potential risk to residents and rural firemen, had the fire come down into private property, was never realized (though the anxiety for residents was). I encourage people to thank God for that, not the USFS, because all the knowledge that I have gathered regarding this fire and fires in general has led me to the conclusion that ultimately this fire did what it wanted; meaning it went wherever weather and conditions took it. If God had allowed certain weather and conditions, the Kootenai Creek Fire could have burned all the way to Highway 93, if not to the river and even beyond. I am not saying to not thank the firefighters for the work that they did, I am just putting the whole situation into perspective.
This is a serious breech of public trust
In conclusion, I believe that the facts that I have presented here represent a major breech of public trust by USFS officials. This is a serious situation; had anyone been killed by this fire, or had any homes been destroyed, I am confident that there is sufficient evidence to attach liability for such to the USFS. This situation calls into question the credibility of information coming from the Bitterroot National Forest office and especially the Stevensville Ranger District office. There should be an investigation to find out who all is responsible, and to answer the unanswered questions. It will not be acceptable for the top officials who were in charge during the first week to pass the buck and blame subordinates, unless there is very clear evidence indicating that they were misled. My investigation indicates that they had sufficient knowledge and opportunity to make the decision to contain this fire while it was small. Going forward I want the USFS to know that we the people will hold them accountable. We expect them to keep accurate records and to operate in an open, transparent way. In closing, I want to thank those in the USFS who are doing their job honestly and ethically.
Andrew Luibrand
Pictures of the Kootenai Creek Fire
These pictures are from the USFS (Bitterroot National Forest).
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As the file names indicate, this picture and the next two were taken on July 14, 2009. The brown trees mark probably most of the area that had burned.
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The hillside is steep, despite what it looks like in pictures, but it is not inaccessible.
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As you can see, the fire was inactive.
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This picture and the next two were taken on July 18, 2009. As you can see, the fire had not burned much since the previous pictures (July 14th).
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Taken on July 18, 2009 at 3:36pm. The fire was very inactive, even at that time of the day.
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Taken on July 18, 2009.
If you would like to look at the USFS documents quoted above, they can be found in the following files:
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